Description

MAC address randomisation is the OS-level countermeasure that rotates the MAC address used in Wi-Fi probe requests so that passive sniffers cannot link successive frames to the same device. iOS, Android, and Windows have all rolled it out in slightly different forms. From the sensing side it is the central obstacle to wifi-probe-request-sensing working as a long-term tracking primitive and is the constant context for any privacy-aware CSI / probe-request crowd-analytics pipeline.

When it's used

  • Privacy threat model in crowd-analytics deployments
  • De-randomisation feature engineering (IE fingerprints, sequence numbers)
  • Justification for moving from probe sniffing to CSI-based occupancy

Limitations

  • Implementations leak side-channels (sequence numbers, vendor IEs)
  • Vendor inconsistency complicates sensing pipelines
  • Counter-counter-measures change the threat model regularly

Source Papers

  • longo2019_b72f — MAC randomisation in probe-based counting
  • pronello2025_9dc1 — randomisation impact on mobility analysis
  • ficara2024_f89b — randomisation in crowd analytics

5 vault papers use this method

Titles and DOIs only — no abstracts, no analyses.

  • A low-cost automatic people-counting system at bus stops using Wi-Fi probe requests and deep learning 2025 DOI ↗
  • Privacy-preserving WiFi fingerprint-based people counting for crowd management 2024 DOI ↗
  • A Tutorial on Privacy, RCM and Its Implications in WLAN 2024 DOI ↗
  • Estimating indoor crowd density and movement behavior using WiFi sensing 2022 DOI ↗
  • Nationwide deployment and operation of a virtual arrival detection system in the wild 2021 DOI ↗